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Abstract
The intuitionistic implication and hence the notion of function
space in constructive disciplines is both non-geometric and impred-
icative. In this paper we try to solve both of these problems by first
introducing weak exponential objects as a formalization for predica-
tive function spaces and then by proposing modal spaces as a way
to introduce a natural family of geometric predicative implications
based on the interplay between the concepts of time and space. This
combination then leads to a brand new family of modal propositional
logics with predicative implications and then to topological semantics
for these logics and some weak modal and sub-intuitionistic logics, as
well. Finally, we will lift these notions and the corresponding relations
to a higher and more structured level of modal topoi and modal type
theory.
1 Introduction
Intuitionistic logic appears in different many branches of mathematics with
many different and interesting incarnations. In geometrical world it plays
the role of the language of a topological space via topological semantics and
in a higher and more structured level, it becomes the internal logic of any
elementary topoi. On the other hand and in the theory of computations, the
intuitionistic logic shows its computational aspects as a method to describe
the behavior of computations using realizability interpretations and in cate-
gory theory it becomes the syntax of the very central class of Cartesian closed
categories. In all of these incarnations though, we can name some unexpected
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behaviors that relates to the definition of the intuitionistic implication and
as we believe its impredicative definition as a part of the well-known BHK
interpretation. In the rest of this introduction we will explain what these be-
haviors are, why they are unexpected and how we can resolve the situation.
Let us begin our journey by the interesting case of geometry. Since
Tarski’s seminal work [5], it has been well-known that the intuitionistic logic
can be interpreted, in a sound and complete way, in topological spaces. In
this sense, it is meaningful to assume that in contrast to the fact that the
classical logic is the logic of sets, the intuitionistic logic should be considered
as the logic of the notion of space. This assumption becomes more evident
when we see the appearance of intuitionistic logic in the generalized geomet-
rical discourses such as the topos theory, or more recently, the homotopy
theory. However, the situation is not as clear as one expects. A geometrical
concept is not just anything that appears in all the geometrical situations
but a concept which is preserved by the morphisms of the discourse and this
is exactly where some problems come to the scene. Let us explain the phe-
nomenon more precisely using the simpler case of topological spaces as the
topological models of the propositional intuitionistic logic. The definition of
the topological interpretation is the following: Let (X, τ) be a topological
space and V an interpretation which assigns open subsets of X to the atomic
formulas in the language. Next, extend V to the class of all formulas in the
following natural way: Interpret conjunction, disjunction, ⊥ and ⊤ as the
intersection, union, the empty subset and the whole subset X , respectively.
And interpret the implication A→ B as int(V (A)c ∪ V (B)). From the intu-
ition that we have explained already, it is natural to interpret V (C) as the
geometrical content of the sentence C in the topological space (X, τ) and
then expect that all continuous functions preserve this geometrical content.
More precisely, we expect that if f : (X, τ)→ (Y, η) is continuous, then f−1
sends the geometrical content of any formula C in (Y, η) to the geometrical
content of the same formula in (X, τ). If we apply this idea just to a single
logical constant, it implies that the inverse image function should preserve
all the logical constants in the language. And using the definition of the in-
terpretation, it is pretty clear that for all the logical constants, except for the
implication, this is the case. However, the case of the implication is totally
different and it is in fact the source of the problems here. Let us explain
this unexpected behavior by an example: let f : R → R as the following
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continuous function:
f(x) =


−x− 1 x ∈ (−∞,−1)
0 x ∈ [−1,−1]
x+ 1 x ∈ (1,+∞)
and consider U = (0,+∞). Then, it is easy to compute that f−1(U → ⊥) = ∅
and f−1(U)→ f−1(⊥) = (−1, 1) which means
f−1(U → ⊥) 6= f−1(U)→ f−1(⊥).
Therefore, we can conclude that the geometric morphisms do not preserve
the intuitionistic implication which implies that this constant is not gen-
uinely geometric and we have to refine its definition if we want to have any
meaningful geometric logic. There are different approaches to deal with this
problem. The first one is the approach of geometric logic and it is based on
the total elimination of the implication constant. From the logical point of
view this approach seems extremely limiting and it leaves the logic without
its usual power to formalize mathematical theories. However, in the real
situations arising in topos theory it actually leads to deep understanding of
the geometrical content of mathematical theories. The other approach is to
keep the implication but weaken its power in a way that the geometric maps
or at least some natural classes of them preserve this new implication. To
implement this idea, we will extend the coherent logic with an implication
which is weaker than the usual intuitionistic implication and we will show
that it gets preserved under a natural class of continuous functions.
So far, we have investigated the geometrical case of implication. Let us
now focus on the the second aspect of intuitionistic logic as a meta-theory
for the notion of computability or more generally as a calculus of construc-
tions. To do so, consider the BHK interpretation as the informal canonical
interpretation of the intuitionistic constants and let us explain how it works.
For simplicity, interpret any formula A as the set of all of its proofs and write
a ∈ A as the proposition “a is a proof for A”. Then:
For conjunction we have:
A ∧ B = {(b, c)|b ∈ A and c ∈ B}
which means that a construction a is a proof for A ∧B iff a equals to a pair
(b, c) where b is a proof for A and c is a proof for B.
Similarly, for the disjunction we have
A ∨B = {(i, c)|if i = 0 then b ∈ A and if i = 1 then c ∈ B}
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which means that a is a proof for A∨B if a is a pair that the first component
says which of A or B is proved and the second component provides the
corresponding proof.
And for the implication we have
A→ B = {f |∀x ∈ A→ f(x) ∈ B}
which means that f is a proof for A→ B if f provides a method to transform
any proof of A to a proof of B.
The first and the second parts are simple and acceptable. The definition
is recursive and to define the notion of proof, it is enough to just refer locally
to the structure of the possible proof and the recursive notion of “being a
proof” that we are defining. But in the case of implication, the definition
uses a universal quantifier on all possible constructions, including the proofs
of A → B themselves, that we are defining at the moment. This definition
in this present form is clearly impredicative. It is possible to see this impred-
icativity in a more technical way and in the concrete case of computability
theory. To do so, consider the sister notion of realizabality and the case of
realization of the elimination rule of the implication. To realize this rule, we
clearly need the universal Turing machine to apply any arbitrary Turing ma-
chine, including itself, to all the possible inputs. There is no need to explain
how and why this should be considered self-referential and hence impred-
icative. (For a historical and philosophical discussion on impredicativity of
intuitionistic implication, See [7].)
To deal with this impredicative definition, one reasonable approach is us-
ing the notion of time to control the order of constructing proofs to keep
everything predicative. Roughly speaking, after adding time to the game
we can revise the BHK interpretation in the following way: f is a proof of
A → B at the time instance n, if for any proof x of A appearing in time
m after n, f(x) is a proof for B at the same time m. As it may be clear
even from this rough explanation, formalizing this concept needs considering
presheaves over some poset to capture the growing constructions over the
structure of time. Moreover, and more importantly, we also need a suitable
functor on our constructions to take care of the modality of time or more
precisely the preposition “after” in the definition. We will call these topoi,
modal topoi and we will explain them in the last section of this paper.
And finally and as the third example, consider the Cartesian closed cat-
egories and their relationship with simply typed lambda calculus which can
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be considered as the higher and more structured propositional intuitionistic
logic. It seems that these categories formalize the intuitive idea of being
closed in category theory in the sense that they have an internal hom functor
to simulate the behavior of their external Hom functor. The problem here is
also the elimination rule which is just the evaluation map in this discourse.
Consider the definition of the exponential objects. Intuitively, BA plays the
role of Hom(A,B) internally. Then the question is that what does it mean
to have an arrow ev : A × BA → B. Intuitively, it means that it applies all
morphisms in BA to the elements of their source A. But in the categorical
discipline we can not and should not refer to the elements of an object, first
because it contradicts with the conceptual foundation of category theory and
second, because it simply is meaningless in the case that the category is not a
category of structured sets. In the best case, we can at most use generalized
elements for this morphism and talk about something like A1×BA → B1 or
more generally AC × BA → BC . One can try to justify the evaluation map
using these generalized elements and another assumption that says A ≃ A1.
What the assumption says is that the object A has the same role in the
category as A1. It can happen in some cases that the category satisfies this
condition as an extra feature but it is definitely not related to the notion of
closedness. To have another intuition, think about it in the following way:
BA internalizes the Hom structure of the category but this internalization is
not necessarily related to the lower level of the real objects. Therefore, we
can claim that the way that Cartesian closed categories capture the notion
of closedness is not faithful and it has more hidden assumptions than what
it reveals at the first glance. The solution for this problem is formalizing
a new weaker type of exponential objects which mimic the behavior of the
external Hom functor in a more faithful manner. This is what we call weak
exponentials and we will define in the first following section.
2 Weak Exponentials
Let us first define the notion of a weak exponential. As we explained in
the Introduction, it is supposed to formalize the concept of closedness with-
out conceptual referring to any assumed internal structure of objects. The
definition is a variant of Eilenberg-Kelly’s definition of closed categories [4].
Definition 2.1. Let C be a category with finite products and terminal object.
A functor [−,−] : Cop × C → C together with the following data
(i) a transformation jX : 1→ [X,X ], extranatural in X ,
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(ii) a transformation LXY Z : [X, Y ] × [Y, Z] → [X,Z] natural in X and Z
and extranatural in Y
is called weak exponential or weak internal hom if the following diagrams
commute:
(i) For every X , and Y , jX plays the right unit role for the composition L:
1× [X, Y ]
[X,X ]× [X, Y ] [X, Y ]
〈jX , id[X,Y ]〉
LXXY
p1 ◦ id[X,Y ]
(ii) For every X , and Y , jY plays the left unit role for the composition L:
[X, Y ]× 1
[X, Y ]× [Y, Y ] [X, Y ]
〈id[X,Y ], jY 〉
LYXY
p0 ◦ id[X,Y ]
(iii) L is associative, i.e. for every X , Y , Z and W :
[X, Y ]× [Y, Z]× [Z,W ] [X,Z]× [Z,W ]
[X, Y ]× [Y,W ] [X,W ]
〈LYXZ 〈p0, p1〉, p2〉
〈p0, L
Z
Y W 〈p1, p2〉〉
LYXW
LZXW
The category C equipped with a weak exponential is called strong. Moreover,
if the map γ : C(X, Y )→ C(1, [X, Y ]) defined by f 7→ [1, f ](jX) is a bijection,
the strong category C is called weakly-closed. If there exists also a natural
transformation iX : X → [1, X ], the category is called a Curry category and
if i is a natural isomorphism, it is called a closed category.
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It is clear that being strong in the sense of Definition 2.1 means that
the category is strong enough to internalize its Hom structure while weakly
closedness is just the condition that the category is actually internalizes ex-
actly the Hom structure and it does not add anything else to it.
There are some natural concrete examples of weak exponentials.
Example 2.2. Let C be a Cartesian closed category and F : C → C be an
arbitrary functor. Define [X, Y ] = exp(FX, FY ) and [f, g] = exp(Ff, Fg)
and use j and L as the original natural transformations available in C.
Example 2.3. Consider the category Top of topological spaces and continu-
ous functions. We know that Top is not Cartesian closed. However, there ex-
ists a natural canonical weak exponential object inside the category which in-
ternalizes some part of the structure of the category itself. Suppose TopCHaus
is the subcategory of all compact Hausdorff spaces, β : Top → TopCHaus
is a Stone-Cech compactification functor and U : TopCHaus → Top is the
forgetful functor. We know that β ⊣ U . Since all compact Hausdorff
spaces are exponentiable we can define [X, Y ] = U [(βY )βX ] and consider
iX : X → U(βX)
1 = [1, X ] as the composition of the unit of the compactifi-
cation adjunction and the isomorphism between βX and (βX)1. Hence Top
with this structure is a Curry category.
Example 2.4. Let C be a small category and I : C → C be an arbitrary
functor. Then consider the category of presheaves E = SetC
op
and [−,−] :
Eop × E → E as
[E, F ](c) = Hom(y(I(c))× E, F )
and [α, β](c)(f) = βf(id×α). It is not hard to observe that this functor is a
weak exponential using the most natural j and L. For some concrete useful
instance of this presheaf construction, put C = (N,≤) as the usual poset
category of natural numbers and I : N→ N as the functor i(n) = n+ 1.
3 Modal Spaces
In this section we will define the notion of modal space as an abstract set-
ting which provides a natural candidate for predicative implication. For this
purpose, let us begin with a concrete model to explain how the notion of
time can be effective in defining predicative implications and then we will
generalize the setting to the more abstract situations.
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Assume that (N,≤) is the usual set of natural numbers with its usual
order as the formalization of the notion of time and also assume that we
are interested in the class of all increasing functions f : N → {0, 1} as the
class of variable statements which their truth values vary in time. First of
all, note that this situation is a loose version of what we explained in the
Introduction in which we replaced constructions by truth values. The rea-
son is that this truth value type of investigation is more appropriate in the
case of propositional statements that just have truth value. To speak about
constructions we have to go one level up to work with simply typed lambda
calculus which is actually what we intend to do in the last section of this
paper. Secondly, it is pretty clear that there exist natural interpretations
for conjunction and disjunction in this discourse. It is enough to interpret
conjunction as the the pointwise minimum of functions and disjunction as
the pointwise maximum. For implication, if we follow the intuition that we
explained before, we will have the following definition: [f → g](n) = 1 iff for
all x > n, f(x) ≤ g(x) which means that the statement f → g is true at n if
for every instance x after n, f(x) implies g(x). It seems that we have had a
satisfactory formalization of all propositional constants and specifically the
predicative implication. But there is a problem with this formalization. If
we investigate our construction carefully, we will observe that what we used
was just the preposition after and not the whole power of the concept of
time which more or less determines every details of the whole setting and
then leaves no room for generalization. Therefore, the natural question now
is that is there any generalized setting in which we can implement the con-
struction of implication? In other words, is it possible to find an abstract
version of the preposition after without referring to the notion of time? The
answer to this question is positive and we will explain how.
First let us import some topological language to simplify the situation.
Put the order topology on the ordered structure (N,≤) in which opens are
just the upward-closed subsets. Then do the same thing for the set of truth
values {0, 1} to have the Sierpinski space. Then an increasing function f :
N → {0, 1} is nothing but a continuous function and since in this situation
a continuous function is uniquely determined with its support f−1(1), we
can change our perspective to consider open subsets instead of increasing
functions and interpret any open U as the points in time that a sentence
is true. Now the conjunction and the disjunction become intersection and
union which are obviously simpler than their original form. For implication
though, we will have the following: n ∈ U → V iff for all x > n, if x ∈ U then
x ∈ V . If we represent any element m by its canonical open Um = {y|y ≥ m}
then we have Un ⊆ U → V iff for all x > n, Ux ∩ U ⊆ V . As we guessed
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before, the only thing to do now is just finding a formalization for x > n.
For this purpose, define the operator J on open subsets in the following way:
JW = {z|∃y ≤ z ∧ y ∈ W}
if we come back to the original definition with functions it is equivalent to
define Jf as Jf(n) = max{f(m)|m ≤ n−˙1} = f(n−˙1). Intuitively, Jf
is just the pulling back version of f over the line of time. Now with this
operator at hand, we know that x > n iff Ux ⊆ JUn. Therefore, it is easy to
see that we can define U → V as
⋃
{W |JW ∩ U ⊆ V }.
This new representation of the predicative implication can be easily lifted to
any topological space and since we did not mention the internal structure
of opens it is possible to generalize it even to locales. But what about the
operator J which is responsible for the effect of time? It is clear that we
have to put some conditions on this operator to have a meaningful inter-
pretation. First note that J is increasing. Second and more importantly, J
preserves unions. The reason is that computing the pointwise maximum of
functions and also computing the pulling back operator J , which is based
on computing maximums, commute. It is also possible to prove that J pre-
serves intersections in our setting with linearly ordered time or even in the
case that we use trees instead of lines. However, in the more general case
this is not necessarily true and as the following investigations show it is not
even needed. Finally, our J has the property JU ⊆ U which means that
the notion of truth is cumulative and preserved by time. However, we also
relax this condition in our general definition to keep the commitments of our
topological semantics as minimal as possible. But we will investigate spaces
with this condition which we will call temporal spaces later. Now we have:
Definition 3.1. A pair (X, J) is called a modal space if X is a locale and
J : X → X is a monotone function which preserves all joins.
Remark 3.2. Note that if we interpret the notion of topology as a covering
property, as it is usual in formal topology, then the condition of being join
preserving means that J respects the topology because if
⋃
i Ui = U then⋃
i J(Ui) = J(U).
Let us illuminate the above definition by some examples:
Example 3.3. Assume that (X, τ) is a topological space and f : X → X is
a continuous function, then (X, τ, f−1) is a modal space. The reason simply
is that f−1 is monotone and union preserving.
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The following two are the generalizations of the setting that we began
with. They will play an important role in the rest of the paper.
Example 3.4. Assume that (W,R) is a relational frame such that R ⊆
W × W and J : P (W ) → P (W ) as J(U) = {x|∃y R(y, x) ∧ y ∈ U}. J
is trivially monotone and join preserving. Therefore, (P (W ), J) is a modal
space.
Example 3.5. Assume that (W,R) is a relational frame such that R ⊆
W × W is a transitive relation. Then define τ as the set of all upward
closed subsets of W . τ is trivially a topology. Define J : τ → τ as J(U) =
{x|∃y R(y, x) ∧ y ∈ U}. First of all, J sends any upward-closed U to an
upward closed set since R is transitive. Secondly, J is trivially monotone
and join preserving. Therefore, ((W, τ), J) is a modal space.
The following shows that any modal space is equipped with its natural
weak implication:
Theorem 3.6. Let (X, J) be a modal space. It is possible to define →:
X × X → X such that for any a, b, c ∈ X, Jc ∧ a ≤ b iff c ≤ a → b. In
categorical terms, J(−)× a is a left adjoint to a→ (−) for any a ∈ X.
Proof. Define a → b =
∨
{d|Jd ∧ a ≤ b}. It is clear that if Jc ∧ a ≤ b
then by definition c ≤ a → b. For the converse, if c ≤ a → b, then c ≤∨
{d|Jd ∧ a ≤ b} hence Jc ≤ J
∨
{d|Jd ∧ a ≤ b} since J preserve all joins,
Jc ≤
∨
{Jd|Jd ∧ a ≤ b}. Therefore, Jc ∧ a ≤
∨
{Jd|Jd ∧ a ≤ b} ∧ a by
distributivity, Jc ∧ a ≤
∨
{Jd ∧ a|Jd ∧ a ≤ b} ≤ b. Hence Jc ∧ a ≤ b.
This weak exponential is well-behaved under the application of continuous
functions, i.e.,
Theorem 3.7. Assume X is a locale, (Y, J) is a modal space and f : X → Y
is a continuous surjection such that f−1 has a left adjoint. Then there exists
I : X → X such that (X, I) is a modal space and f−1(a→J b) = f
−1(a)→I
f−1(b).
Proof. Define I(x) = f−1Jf!(x) where f! is the left adjoint for f
−1. Since
f! is a left adjoint, it is monotone and preserves all joins hence I is also
monotone and join preserving. Moreover, we know that f−1(a→J b) is equal
to f−1(
∨
{c|Jc ∧ a ≤ b}). Since f is continuous, f−1 preserves all joins and
hence f−1(a →J b) is equal to
∨
{f−1(c)|Jc ∧ a ≤ b}. Since f is surjective,
f−1 is one to one, hence Jc ∧ a ≤ b iff f−1(Jc ∧ a) ≤ f−1(b). Since f is
continuous, this is equivalent to f−1(Jc) ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b). On the other
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hand f−1(a) →I f
−1(b) is equivalent to
∨
{d|Id ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b)}. Hence
we have to show that
∨
{f−1(c)|f−1(Jc) ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b)} =
∨
{d|Id ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b)}.
For any c, pick d = f−1(c). Since d ≤ f−1(c), f!(d) ≤ c, hence Jf!(d) ≤ Jc
and then f−1Jf!(d) ≤ f
−1(Jc) therefore Id ≤ f−1(Jc) which means that
f−1(Jc) ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b) implies Id ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b), therefore
∨
{f−1(c)|f−1(Jc) ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b)} ≤
∨
{d|Id ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b)}.
For the converse, if we have d such that Id∧f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b), define c = f!(d).
First of all f−1(Jc) = f−1Jf!(d). Secondly, since f!d ≤ c we have d ≤ f
−1(c)
which implies
∨
{f−1(c)|f−1(Jc) ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b)} ≥
∨
{d|Id ∧ f−1(a) ≤ f−1(b)}
which completes the proof.
The useful corollary of the Theorem 3.7 is:
Corollary 3.8. Assume (Y, σ) is an Alexandrov space, J : σ → σ is a
monotone function and f : (X, τ)→ (Y, σ) is a continuous surjection. Then
there exists I : τ → τ such that (X, τ, I) is a modal space and f−1(a→J b) =
f−1(a)→I f
−1(b).
Proof. Define f!(U) =
⋂
f(U)⊆W W where W is an open subset of Y . f! is
well-defined because the intersection of open subsets is also open. Moreover
we have f! ⊣ f
−1 because if U ⊆ f−1(V ) then f(U) ⊆ V and hence V ∈⋂
f(U)⊆W W and therefore f!(U) ⊆ V . And conversely, if f!(U) ⊆ V then⋂
f(U)⊆W W ⊆ V hence
⋂
f(U)⊆W f
−1(W ) ⊆ f−1(V ). Since for any f(U) ⊆
W , U ⊆ f−1(W ), hence U ⊆
⋂
f(U)⊆W f
−1(W ) which implies U ⊆ f−1(V ).
Hence f! ⊣ f
−1 and finally by the Theorem 3.7 we can prove the claim.
As a conclusion for this section, let us specify some important classes of
modal spaces.
Definition 3.9. (i) The class MS consists of all modal spaces.
(ii) A modal space is called semi-cotemporal if Ja = 0 implies a = 0.
Denote the set of these spaces by sCoTS.
(iii) A modal space is called semi-temporal if JJ(a) ≤ J(a). Denote the set
of these spaces by sTS.
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(iv) A modal space is called temporal if J(a) ≤ a. Denote the set of these
spaces by TS.
(v) A modal space is called cotemporal if a ≤ J(a). Denote the set of these
spaces by CoTS.
Moreover, by sS we mean sCoTS ∩TS and by S we mean TS ∩T and
when we put b in the left hand-side of the name of the class, we mean the
subclass of all boolean modal spaces.
The following theorem shows how modal spaces are related to the cate-
gories with weak exponentials:
Theorem 3.10. Let (X, J) be a modal space, then
(i) X equipped with →J is a strong category.
(ii) X equipped with →J is weakly closed iff J(1) = 1.
(iii) X equipped with →J is Curry category iff (X, J) is temporal.
Proof. For (i), we have to show firstly that a →J b is decreasing in a and
increasing in b, secondly 1 ≤ a→J a and thirdly the following:
(a→J b) ∧ (b→J c) ≤ (a→J c).
The first condition is clear by the definition of a→J b and the fact that J is
monotone. The second is clear by the Theorem 3.6, because 1 ≤ a →J a iff
J1∧ a ≤ a which is the case. For the third one, again by using the Theorem
3.6, it is enough to check J [(a →J b) ∧ (b →J c)] ∧ a ≤ c. But since J is
increasing,
J [(a→J b) ∧ (b→J c)] ≤ J(a→J b) ∧ J(b→J c).
Now taking meet with a and using the facts that a ∧ J(a →J b) ≤ b and
b ∧ J(b→J c) ≤ c, we will have
J [(a→J b) ∧ (b→J c)] ∧ a ≤ c.
For (ii), notice that X is weakly closed if a →J b = 1 implies a ≤ b.
Hence, if J(1) = 1, then by Theorem 3.6, 1 ≤ a →J b implies J(1) ∧ a ≤ b
which implies a ≤ b. Conversely, assume that the category is weakly closed.
We have 1→J J(1) = 1 because
1→J J(1) =
∨
Jc≤J(1)
c = 1.
Hence by weakly closedness 1 ≤ J(1) which means that J(1) = 1.
For (iii), note that the category is Curry if for any a, a ≤ 1→J a which
is equivalent to Ja ≤ a, by Theorem 3.6.
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4 Modal Logics and Topological Semantics
In this section we will show how modal spaces make a sound and complete
topological interpretation for some basic modal logics. But first we need to
define the boolean modal spaces to interpret the classical logic in the base of
the classical modal systems.
Definition 4.1. A modal space (X, J) is called boolean if the locale X is
boolean, i.e. for any a ∈ X there exists an element b ∈ X (a complement for
a) such that a ∧ b = 0 and a ∨ b = 1.
Remark 4.2. Note that the complement is trivially unique because if b and
c are both complements of a then by definition (a ∨ b) ∧ c = 1 ∧ c = c but
by distributivity (a ∨ b) ∧ c = (a ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ c) = b ∧ c. Hence b ∧ c = c. By
symmetry we have b ∧ c = b and hence b = c. Therefore the complement is
unique and we can denote it by ¬a.
Now we are ready to expand the well-known relationship between topo-
logical spaces and the extensions of the modal logic S4 to the extensions of
K and the boolean modal spaces. This shows how the language of modal
logic can serve as the language for boolean modal spaces. Later, we will show
the same kind of relationship between the sub-intuitionistic logics and the
modal spaces without the boolean condition.
Definition 4.3. A topological model for modal logics is a tuple (X, J, V )
such that X is a boolean locale, (X, J) is a modal space and V : L → X is
a valuation function such that:
(i) V (⊤) = 1 and V (⊥) = 0.
(ii) V (A ∧ B) = V (A) ∧ V (B).
(iii) V (A ∨ B) = V (A) ∨ V (B).
(iv) V (A→ B) = ¬V (A) ∨ V (B).
(v) V (¬A) = ¬V (A).
(vi) V (A) =
∨
{c|Jc ≤ V (A)} = 1→J V (A).
We say (X, J, V )  Γ ⇒ A when
∧
γ∈Γ V (γ) ≤ V (A) and (X, J)  Γ ⇒ A
when for all V , (X, J, V )  Γ ⇒ A. Moreover, if for some fix X and for all
(X, J) in some class C we have (X, J)  Γ⇒ A, then we write X C Γ⇒ A.
Also when Γ is empty, we omit the symbol ⇒ in all of the situations.
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The following examples show how the modal spaces can be used to refute
some modal statements.
Example 4.4. Let X be a set and f a function on X . Define Xf =
(P (X), Jf) where Jf : P (X) → P (X) is the inverse image function, i.e.
Jf (U) = f
−1(U). It is clear that P (X) is boolean and J is monotone and
join preserving. It is also easy to see that for any modal formula A, we have
V (A) =
⋃
{U |f−1(U) ⊆ V (A)} = f(V (A)). Now assume that there exists
U ⊆ X such that f(U) * f(f((U)) then if we define V (p) = U we have
V (p) * V (p) which implies Xf 2 p→ p.
Example 4.5. Let X be a set and consider the model XA = (P (X), JA)
where JA : P (X) → P (X) is the following function: JA(U) = U ∩ A. It is
clear that P (X) is boolean and J is monotone and join preserving. Now, we
want to show that XA 2 p → p. Pick V (p) = B such that Ac * B. Then
we have V (p) =
⋃
{U |U ∩ A ⊆ B} = Ac ∪ B. Hence, V (p) = Ac ∪ B *
B = V (p).
In the following we will show the soundness of the topological semantics:
Theorem 4.6. (Soundness Theorem)
(i) If Γ ⊢K A, then Γ bMS A.
(ii) If Γ ⊢D A, then Γ bsCoTS A.
(iii) If Γ ⊢T A, then Γ bCoT A.
(iv) If Γ ⊢K4 A, then Γ bsTS A.
(v) If Γ ⊢KD4 A, then Γ bsS A.
(vi) If Γ ⊢S4 A, then Γ bS A.
Proof. First of all it is clear that a proof for the case Γ = ∅ suffices. Now,
by induction on the length of the proof of A in the corresponding system,
we will prove that for any corresponding modal space (X, J) and any V ,
(X, J, V )  A. If A is a classical tautology then the claim is clear since X is
a boolean locale.
For (i), if A is an instance of the axiom K then we have to show
V ((B → C)→ V (B → C)) = 1.
To this end, it is enough to show
V ((B → C)) ∧ V (B) ≤ V (C).
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Assume J(a) ≤ ¬V (B) ∨ V (C) and J(b) ≤ V (B), then J(a) ∧ J(b) ≤ V (C).
Since J is monotone, J(a ∧ b) ≤ J(a) ∧ J(b), hence, J(a ∧ b) ≤ C, therefore
for any generating a for V ((B → C)) and any generating b for V (B), a∧ b
is a generating element for C, hence V ((B → C)) ∧ V (B) ≤ V (C).
For (ii), if A is the axiom D = ¬⊥, then V (⊥) =
∨
{a|Ja ≤ 0} = 0 since
the modal space is semi-cotemporal.
For (iii), if A is an instance of the axiom T, then we have to show V (B) ≤
V (B). Assume that a is a generating element for V (B), then J(a) ≤ V (B).
Since the modal space is cotemporal, we have a ≤ J(a). Hence we conclude
a ≤ V (B) which completes the proof.
For (iv), if A is an instance of the axiom 4, then we have to show V (B) ≤
V (B). Assume that a is a generating element for V (B), then J(a) ≤
V (B). First we show J(a) ≤ V (B). Since the modal space is semi-
temporal, we have JJ(a) ≤ J(a) and thus JJ(a) ≤ V (B). Hence, JJ(a)
is a generating element for V (B), therefore J(a) ≤ V (B). Now, we know
that a is a generating element for V (B), hence V (B) ≤ V (B).
For the rules, if A is proved by the modus ponens rule then the claim is
easy to prove. And if A is proved by the necessitation rule, we have V (B) = 1
then V (B) =
⋃
{a|J(a) ≤ V (B) = 1} = 1 which is what we wanted.
Moreover, we can prove the completeness of these topological models:
Theorem 4.7. (Completeness Theorem)
(i) If Γ bMS A, then Γ ⊢K A.
(ii) If Γ bsCoTS A, then Γ ⊢D A.
(iii) If Γ bCoT A, then Γ ⊢T A.
(iv) If Γ bsTS A, then Γ ⊢K4 A.
(v) If Γ bsS A, then Γ ⊢KD4 A.
(vi) If Γ bS A, then Γ ⊢S4 A.
Proof. To prove the completeness we will use the Kripke completeness for
the modal systems. It is enough to consider the relational frame (W,R, V )
as a modal space (P (W ), τ, V ′) as in the Example 3.4 where V ′ = V . By
induction on the complexity of the formula A, we want to prove w ∈ V ′(A)
iff w  A. The atomic case is trivial by definition. The cases for con-
jucntion, disjunction and implication are also trivial. For the modal case,
assume w ∈ V ′(A) =
⋃
JU⊆V ′(A) U . Therefore, there exists U such that
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w ∈ U and JU ⊆ V ′(A). Hence if (w, u) ∈ R, then u ∈ JU and thus
u ∈ V ′(A). By IH, u  A. Hence w  A. Conversely, if w  A then for
all u such that (w, u) ∈ R we have u  A which by using IH implies that
u ∈ V ′(A). Therefore if we define U = {w} then by the definition of J we
have JU = {u|(w, u) ∈ R} ⊆ V ′(A). Hence w ∈ V ′(A).
The only thing that remains to prove is the compatibility conditions:
If (W,R) is serial, then if J(U) = ∅ then U = ∅. Because if x ∈ U , then
since R is serial, there exists y such that (x, y) ∈ R. Hence by definition
y ∈ J(U) = ∅ which is a contradiction.
If (W,R) is transitive, then JJ(U) ⊆ J(U) because if x ∈ JJ(U), then there
exists y ∈ J(U) such that (y, x) ∈ R. By the same line of reasoning, there
exists z ∈ U such that (z, y) ∈ R. Since R is transitive, (z, x) ∈ R, therefore
x ∈ J(U).
If (W,R) is reflexive, then U ⊆ J(U) because if x ∈ U , then (x, x) ∈ R hence
x ∈ J(U).
In the rest of this section we will try to generalize the completeness theo-
rem to a more powerful version. In that version we fix the topological space
and we will show how a modal logic can be considered as the modal logic of
just one space.
Theorem 4.8. Assume X and Y are boolean spaces and f : X → Y is
a continuous surjection. Then for any modal formula A, if X C A then
Y C A for any class C as in the Definition 3.9.
Proof. Let V be a valuation for (Y, I). Define V ′(p) = f−1(V (p)). Since any
boolean locale is Alexandrov, by Theorem 3.8 we can prove that there exist J
such that (X, J) is a modal space and f−1(a→I b) = f
−1(a)→J f
−1(b). It is
easy to prove by induction on the complexity of A that V ′(A) = f−1(V (A)).
For the atomic A = p it is clear by the definition of V ′. For A = ⊥,⊤, we
have to show that f−1(0) = 0 and f−1(1) = 1. Both are correct since f−1 is
a right and also left adjoint and hence preserves limits and colimits.
The conjunction and disjunction parts are proved by the fact that f−1 pre-
serves meet and join because it is continuous. The proof of the modal part
is implied by the fact that f−1(a→I b) = f
−1(a)→J f
−1(b) and f−1(1) = 1.
Therefore for any A we have, V ′(A) = f−1(V (A)). Since X  A, we have
(X, J, V ′)  A hence V ′(A) = 1, therefore we have f−1(V (A)) = 1. On the
other hand we know that if f−1(c) = 1 then c = 1 because if f−1(c) = 1
since f−1(1) = 1 we know f−1(c) = f−1(1) but f is a surjection which means
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that f−1 is one to one, hence c = 1. By this consideration and the fact that
f−1(V (A)) = 1 we can deduce V (A) = 1 which completes the proof.
The last thing to prove is that if I has one of the properties in the Definition
3.9 the corresponding J has it as well. If C = sCoTS, then if J(a) = 0 we
have f−1If!(a) = 0 hence If!(a) = 0 therefore f!(a) = 0. Since f!(a) ≤ 0, we
have a ≤ f−1(0) = 0 hence a = 0.
If C = sTS, we want to show that JJ(a) ≤ J(a). Therefore we have to show
f−1If!f
−1If!(a) ≤ f
−1If!(a). Since f!f
−1(c) ≤ c for any c, f!f
−1If!(a) ≤
If!(a) therefore If!f
−1If!(a) ≤ IIf!(a). Since IIf!(a) ≤ If!(a), we have
If!f
−1If!(a) ≤ If!(a) which implies f
−1If!f
−1If!(a) ≤ f
−1If!(a).
If C = CoTS, we want to show that a ≤ J(a). It is equivalent to a ≤
f−1If!(a) which is also equivalent to f!(a) ≤ If!(a) which what we have.
Corollary 4.9. (Completeness Theorem, Strong version) For any topological
space with infinitely many connected components we have:
(i) If X bMS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢K A.
(ii) If X bsCoTS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢D A.
(iii) If X bCoTS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢T A.
(iv) If X bsTS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢K4 A.
(v) If X bsS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢KD4 A.
(vi) If X bS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢S4 A.
Proof. The reason is that the modal spaces constructed by the finite rela-
tional frames are enough for completeness and for any of them like (P (W ), JR),
it is possible to find a surjective continuous function f : X → W .
5 J-Logics and Sub-intuitionistic Logics
So far, we have seen how modal logics can be used to describe the geometrical
nature of modal spaces. However, modal systems do not provide a good syn-
tactical reflection of the geometrical situation that we face in modal spaces.
Therefore, it will be convenient to develop some propositional systems to
have a more faithful language to formalize modal spaces. Moreover and after
introducing these systems, we will show how some sub-intuitionistic logics
can be embedded in these systems and how consequently the modal spaces
can be considered as the natural topological interpretation of these weak log-
ics.
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Let LJ be the usual language of propositional logic with a unary modal
operator J . To introduce some formal systems in this language, consider the
following set of natural deduction rules:
Structural Rules:
Γ ⊢ A
F
JΓ ⊢ JA
Γ0 ⊢ A Γ1, A ⊢ B
cut
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ B
Propositional Rules:
⊤
Γ ⊢ ⊤
Γ ⊢ ⊥
⊥
Γ ⊢ A
Γ0, A ⊢ C Γ1, B ⊢ C
∨E
Γ0,Γ1, A ∨B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ Ai
∨I (i = 0, 1)
Γ ⊢ A0 ∨A1
Γ ⊢ A0 ∧A1
∧E (i = 0, 1)
Γ ⊢ Ai
Γ0 ⊢ A Γ1 ⊢ B
∧I
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ A ∧ B
Γ0 ⊢ A Γ1 ⊢ J(A→ B)
→ E
Γ0,Γ1 ⊢ B
JΓ, A ⊢ B
→ I
Γ ⊢ A→ B
Additional Rules:
JA ⊢ ⊥
sCoJ
A ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ A
CoJ
Γ ⊢ JA
Γ ⊢ JA
J
Γ ⊢ A
Note that in the rules → I and F , Γ can have exactly one element.
Now define the system minimal J-logic as the logic with all the structural
and propositional rules. If we add to this logic the rule sCoJ we will have the
logic sCoJ and similarly for the other rules. Note that we show the resulting
system of adding both of the rules sCoJ and J as sI and the system with
the rules J and CoJ as I.
Definition 5.1. A topological model for J-logics is a tuple (X, J, V ) such
that (X, J) is a modal space and V : LJ → X is a valuation function such
that:
(i) V (⊤) = 1 and V (⊥) = 0.
(ii) V (A ∧ B) = V (A) ∧ V (B).
(iii) V (A ∨ B) = V (A) ∨ V (B).
(iv) V (A→ B) = V (A)→J V (B).
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(v) V (JA) = JV (A).
We say (X, J, V )  Γ ⇒ A when
∧
γ∈Γ V (γ) ≤ V (A) and (X, J)  Γ ⇒ A
when for all V , (X, J, V )  Γ ⇒ A. Moreover, if for some fix X and for all
(X, J) in some class C we have (X, J)  Γ⇒ A, then we write X C Γ⇒ A.
Furthermore, we omit the symbol ⇒ in all the cases where Γ is empty.
As we expect, we have the following soundness theorem.
Theorem 5.2. (Soundness Theorem)
(i) If Γ ⊢mJ A then MS  Γ⇒ A.
(ii) If Γ ⊢sCoJ A then sCoTS  Γ⇒ A.
(iii) If Γ ⊢CoJ A then CoTS  Γ⇒ A.
(iv) If Γ ⊢J A then TS  Γ⇒ A.
(v) If Γ ⊢sI A then sS  Γ⇒ A.
(vi) If Γ ⊢I A then S  Γ⇒ A.
Proof. Since the logics are just the syntactical representations of the struc-
ture of the modal spaces, the soundness theorem is clear and we will skip the
details of its proof.
To prove the completeness, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 5.3. Let A = (A,≤,∧,∨, 0, 1, J,→) be a structure where (A,≤) is
a poset with meet ∧, joint ∨, the zero element 0, the one element 1 and J is
monotone such that J(−)∧a is a left adjoint to a→ (−) for all a ∈ A. Then
there exists a modal space (X, I) such that the structure A is embeddable in
(X, I). Moreover, if A has any of the properties of the Definition 3.9, so does
(X, I).
Proof. The proof is just the usual proof of the Stone type duality. Define X
as the set of all downward-closed subsets of A which includes 0 and closed
under all joins. Define the order and the meet as the inclusion and the
intersection and the join of {Ui}i∈I as
{z|∃ui ∈ Ui, z ≤
∨
i∈I
ui}
Also define 1 as A, 0 as {0} and I(V ) = {u|u ≤ Jv, v ∈ V }. It is not
hard to check that X is a locale and I is join-preserving. Hence, (X, I) is
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a modal space. Now, define U : A → X as U(a) = {b|b ≤ a}. Since U(a)
is downward-closed and closed under joins, U is well-defined. It is easy to
prove that U preserves all the lattice structure including J and → and all
the properties of the Definition 3.9.
Theorem 5.4. (Completeness Theorem)
(i) If MS  Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢mJ A.
(ii) If sCoTS  Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢sCoJ A.
(iii) If CoTS  Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢CoJ A.
(iv) If TS  Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢J A.
(v) If sS  Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢sI A.
(vi) If S  Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢I A.
Proof. Pick one of the logics that we want to prove the completeness for. By
⊢ we mean the provability in that system. The proof is the usual Lindenbaum
type proof augmented with the embedding of Lemma 5.3. Define X to be
the set of all formulas of the language LJ . Define the equivalence relation ≡
as A ≡ B iff A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A. It is clear that (X/ ≡,⊢) is a poset with all
finite meets and joins. Moreover it has the zero and one elements and J and
→ such that J(−) × A is a left adjoint for A → (−). By Lemma 5.3, there
exists a modal space (Y, I) into which we can embed the structure of X by
some morphism φ. Define V (p) = φ(p). Therefore, it is easy to check that
for all formulas C, V (C) = φ(C). Therefore, since (Y, I, V )  Γ ⊢ A we have
V (
∧
Γ) ≤ V (A). Hence φ(
∧
Γ) ≤ φ(A). Since φ is an embedding, Γ ⊢ A
which completes the proof.
Theorem 5.5. Assume X and Y are modal spaces, Y is Alexandrov and
f : X → Y is a continuous surjection. Then for any formula A ∈ LJ , if
X C A then Y C A for any class C as in the Definition 3.9.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of the Theorem 4.8.
Theorem 5.6. (Completeness Theorem, Strong version) Let X be a topo-
logical space with continuum many connected components, then:
(i) If X MS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢mJ A.
(ii) If X sCoTS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢sCoJ A.
(iii) If X CoTS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢CoJ A.
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(iv) If X TS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢J A.
(v) If X sS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢sI A.
(vi) If X S Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢I A.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the Theorem 4.9. Note that the
spaces that we used for completeness are Alexandrof and has cardinality at
most equal to the continuum and any topological space with this size is a
continuous image of a topological space with continuum many connected
components.
Now let us review some important sub-intuitionistic logics which were
introduced in [8], [1] and [3]. For this purpose, we need to introduce some
rules in the usual natural deduction system:
Propositional Rules:
A
⊤
⊤
⊥
⊥
A
A B
∧I
A ∧B
A ∧ B
∧E
A
A ∧B
∧E
B
A
∨I
A ∨ B
B
∨I
A ∨ B A ∨ B
[A]
D
C
[B]
D′
C
∨E
C
[A]
D
B
→ I
A→ B
Formalized Rules:
A→ B A→ C
(∧I)f
A→ B ∧ C
A→ C B → C
(∨E)f
A ∨B → C
A→ B B → C
trf
A→ C
Moreover, consider the following additional rules:
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Additional Rules:
⊤ → ⊥
E
⊥
A ∧ (A→ B)
T
B
A
cur
⊤ → A
The condition for the rule → I is that A should be the only assumption to
deduce B. The logic KPC is defined as the system which consists of all the
propositional rules and all the formalized rules. Then BPC is defined as
KPC + Cur, EKPC as KPC plus the rule E, EBPC as BPC plus the
rule E, KTPC as KPC plus the rule T and IPC is defined as BPC+ T .
Remark 5.7. The other way to define BPC is by using the rules for KPC
with relaxing the condition on → I (See [2]). It is clear that the rule cur
is provable by this more strong version of → I. For the converse, first we
will show that using the rule cur, it is possible to prove that C ⊢ D → C
for all the formulas C and D. It is enough to use the cur rule on C to show
C ⊢ ⊤ → C and then note D ⊢ ⊤, hence ⊢ D → ⊤. By tr and formalized tr
we have C ⊢ D → C.
Then assume Γ, A ⊢ B hence
∧
Γ, A ⊢ B and by the original version of → I
we have ⊢
∧
Γ ∧ A → B. But by what we proved and formalized ∧ we can
prove
∧
Γ ⊢ A →
∧
Γ ∧ A, hence by tr, we have
∧
Γ ⊢ A → B which is
equivalent to Γ ⊢ A→ B.
Remark 5.8. Note that the language of these sub-intuitionistic logics is a
subset of the language of J-logics. Therefore, we can apply the topological
semantics for the J-formulas also for these sub-intuitionistic logics.
The following example shows how the interpretation of the usual propo-
sitional formulas works.
Example 5.9. Let a and b be two real numbers and a 6= 0. Now consider
the model Xa,b = (R, τE , Ja,b) where τ is the Euclidean topology and Ja,b :
τ → τ is the following function: Ja,b(U) = aU + b = {ax + b|x ∈ U}. It
is clear that the image of any open U is also open. J is also monotone and
join preserving. Now, we want to show that X 1
2
,0 2 (⊤ → p) ⇒ p. Pick
V (p) = (0, 1). Then we have V (⊤ → p) =
⋃
{U |1
2
U ⊆ (0, 1)} = (0, 2).
Hence, V (⊤ → p) = (0, 2) * (0, 1) = V (p).
Now consider X2,0. We want to show that X2,0 2 p ⇒ ⊤ → p. Pick
V ′(p) = (0, 2) then V ′(⊤ → p) = (0, 1). Hence V ′(p) * V ′(⊤ → p).
Theorem 5.10. (Embedding) Assume Γ∪{A} ⊆ L where L is the language
of propositional logic, then:
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(i) Γ ⊢mJ A iff Γ ⊢KPC A.
(ii) If Γ ⊢sCoJ A iff Γ ⊢EKPC A.
(iii) If Γ ⊢CoJ A iff Γ ⊢KTPC A.
(iv) If Γ ⊢J A iff Γ ⊢BPC A.
(v) If Γ ⊢sI A iff Γ ⊢EBPC A.
(vi) If Γ ⊢I A iff Γ ⊢IPC A.
Proof. To prove the soundness part, note that all the propositional rules ex-
cept → I are available in mJ. Therefore, it remains to show that all the
formalized rules and → I are also provable in mJ. This is what we will do
in the following proof trees. Note that by double line rules we mean that
there is an easy omitted proof tree between the upper part and the lower
part. The main rule among them is the following tree:
A ∧ B ⊢ A ∧ B
∧E
A ∧ B ⊢ A
mJ
J(A ∧ B) ⊢ J(A)
A ∧B ⊢ A ∧ B
∧E
A ∧B ⊢ B
mJ
J(A ∧B) ⊢ J(B)
∧I
J(A ∧ B) ⊢ J(A) ∧ J(B)
For the formalized ∧I, we have:
J(A→ B), A ⊢ B J(A→ C), A ⊢ C
∧I
J(A→ B), J(A→ C), A ⊢ B ∧ C
J((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)), A ⊢ B ∧ C
→ I
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C) ⊢ A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→ B), (A→ C) ⊢ A→ (B ∧ C)
and for the formalized ∨I, we have:
J(A→ C), A ⊢ C J(B → C), B ⊢ C
∨I
J(A→ C), J(B → C), A ⊢ B ∨ C
J((A→ C) ∧ (B → C)), A ⊢ B ∨ C
→ I
(A→ C) ∧ (B → C) ⊢ A→ B ∨ C
(A→ C), (B → C) ⊢ A→ B ∨ C
for the formalized tr, we have:
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J(A→ B), A ⊢ B J(B → C), B ⊢ C
cut
J(A→ B), J(B → C), A ⊢ C
J((A→ B) ∧ (B → C)), A ⊢ C
→ I
(A→ B) ∧ (B → C) ⊢ A→ C
(A→ B), (B → C) ⊢ A→ C
And finally for → I we have:
⊢ ⊤
J(⊤), A ⊢ A A ⊢ B
cut
J(⊤), A ⊢ B
→ I
⊤ ⊢ A→ B
cut
⊢ A→ B
Now we have to show that the additional rules are provable by their corre-
sponding rules. For cur, we will use its characterization based on → I as
mentioned in the Remark 5.7.
J(
∧
Γ) ⊢ J(
∧
Γ)
J
J(
∧
Γ) ⊢
∧
Γ
Γ, A ⊢ B∧
Γ, A ⊢ B
cut
J(
∧
Γ), A ⊢ B
→ I ∧
Γ ⊢ A→ B
Γ ⊢ A→ B
For T and E we have:
A ⊢ A
A→ B ⊢ A→ B
CoJ
A→ B ⊢ J(A→ B)
→ E
A,A→ B ⊢ B
⊤, J(⊤ → ⊥) ⊢ ⊥
J(⊤ → ⊥) ⊢ ⊥
sCoJ
⊤ → ⊥ ⊢ ⊥
To prove the converse, notice that all the Kripke models of the propositional
logics can be translated to the corresponding modal spaces. For this purpose,
we have to divide the proof into two different cases: The first case is when the
rule cur is present in the propositional system and the second case is when
it is not. For the second case, assume (W,R, V ) is the Kripke model, then
define the modal space (P (W ), JR) of this Kripke model as in the Example
3.4 and define V ′(p) = V (p). It is easy to see that for any propositional
formula B, w  B iff w ∈ V ′(B). The proof is exactly the same as the proof
of Theorem 4.7. Therefore, since the sequent Γ ⊢ A is provable in the corre-
sponding J-logic, we know (P (W ), JR, V
′)  Γ⇒ A hence V ′(
∧
Γ) ≤ V ′(A)
which implies (W,R, V )  Γ ⇒ A. Finally, using the completeness of the
Kripke Semantics for the propositional logic we can prove the provability of
Γ ⊢ A in the propositional logic.
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The proof of the first case is the same as the previous case with just a
little change in the definition of the corresponding modal space. In this case
we have to define the modal space as in the Example 3.5. The reason is that
R is transitive and we want JR to have the property of being temporal. Now
define V ′(p) = V (p). Note that by the definition of Kripke models for logics
with the cur rule, V (p) is upward-closed which implies that it is open in our
topological space. Hence V ′(p) is well-defined. The next important part is
the claim that for any propositional formula B, w  B iff w ∈ V ′(B). The
atomic case is trivial by definition. The cases for conjucntion and disjunction
are also trivial. For the implication case, assume
w ∈ V ′(A→ B) =
⋃
{U |JU ∩ V ′(A) ⊆ V ′(B)}.
Therefore, there exists U such that w ∈ U and JU ∩ V ′(A) ⊆ V ′(B). Hence
if (w, u) ∈ R, then u ∈ JU and thus we know that u ∈ V ′(A) implies
u ∈ V ′(B). By IH, if u  A then u  B. Hence w  A → B. Conversely,
if w  A → B then for all u such that (w, u) ∈ R if u  A then u  B. By
using IH it implies that if u ∈ V ′(A) then u ∈ V ′(B). Therefore define U =
{u|(w, u) ∈ R∨ u = w}. Since R is transitive, U is upward-closed and hence
open. On the other hand, by the definition of J we have JU = {u|(w, u) ∈ R}
and since JU ∩ V ′(A) ⊆ V ′(B) we will have w ∈ U ⊆ V ′(A → B). Hence
w ∈ V ′(A→ B).
The rest of the proof is similar to the second case.
Remark 5.11. The sub-intuitionistic logics that we have defined in this sec-
tion have an extreme importance in the philosophical sense. However, their
limited language and specifically their lack of smooth rules for implication
makes developing mathematics on top of them, practically impossible. The
reason, roughly speaking, is the anti-symmetry in the definition of the im-
plication. Although almost all of them have a strong introduction rule for
implication, almost none of them have a reasonable elimination rule. In the
categorical terms, the implication in these systems is not a part of an ad-
junction. The embedding theorem actually solves exactly this problem. It
shows that it is possible to embed these logics to some well-behaved J-logics
which keep the adjunctive symmetry of the rules of logic while it has some
undefined weak modality J to make some room for changes.
By the embedding theorem, we have the soundness-completeness for the
propositional logics with respect to the topological semantics.
Theorem 5.12. (Soundness-Completeness Theorem)
(i) Γ ⊢KPC A iff Γ MS A.
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(ii) If Γ ⊢EKPC A iff Γ sCoTS A.
(iii) If Γ ⊢KTPC A iff Γ CoTS A.
(iv) If Γ ⊢BPC A iff Γ TS A.
(v) If Γ ⊢EBPC A iff Γ sS A.
(vi) If Γ ⊢IPC A iff Γ S A.
With the same line of reasoning as in the Theorem 4.9 and 5.6, it is clear
that we have a stronger version of completeness just by using the topological
spaces with infinitely many connected components. However, in the presence
of the rule cur, the situation becomes more interesting. To explain how, we
need the following topological lemma.
Lemma 5.13. Let X be an infinite Hausdorff space. Then every finite tree
is a sutjective continuous image of X.
Proof. Let us first prove the following claim:
Claim 1. For any natural numbers N and K, there exists a natural num-
ber M such that for any Hausdorff space X with cardinality greater than or
equal toM , there areK many open subspaces of X with at least N elements.
We prove the claim by induction on N . For N = 1, pick M = K and
prove by induction. For K = 1, it is enough to pick the whole space as the
open subset. To prove the claim for K + 1, since we have at least K + 1
elements, we have also at least K elements, and by IH, it is possible to find
at least K non-empty open subsets {Ui}
K
i=0. Pick {xi}
K
i=0 as elements such
that xi ∈ Ui. Therefore, there should be some x /∈ {xi}
K
i=0. Now, use the
condition that the space is Hausdorff to find UK+1 such that x ∈ UK+1 and
UK+1 is disjoint with all Ui’s.
Now, if we have the claim for N , we want to prove it for N +1. By IH we
know that there exists M ′ that works for N and K ′ = 2K. We claim that
M = M ′ works for N + 1 and K. If X has at least M ′ elements, then there
are at lest 2K mutually disjoint opens such that each of them has at least
N elements. If we arrange these 2K, to K pairs that compute their unions,
then we have K opens, each of them contains at least 2N elements, which is
greater than or equal to N .
26
Now we want to prove the following claim:
Claim 2. For any natural number N , there exists a natural number M
such that for any Hausdorff space with at least M elements and any finite
tree with at most N elements, there exists a continuous surjection from the
space to the tree.
We will prove the claim by induction on N . For N = 1 pick M = 1 and
use the constant function. For N +1, by IH, we know that for N there exists
an M ′. Pick M as a number in claim 1, for N and K = M ′. Therefore, the
space X has at least N opens each of them contains at least M ′ elements.
Call them {Ui}
N
i=1. Since the tree has N + 1 element, there are at most N
branches for the root such that each of them has at most N nodes. Call
these branches {Tj}
n
j=0 for some n ≤ N . By IH, we can find a surjective
continuous function fi : Ui → Ti for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Now define f : X → T
as the extension of the union of fi’s such that it sends any x ∈
⋃n
i=1 Ui to the
root r. The function is clearly surjective. For continuity, note that any open
subset of the tree is a upward-closed subset which means that it is equal to T
or it is a subset of one of Ti’s. For the first case, f−1(T ) = X which is open.
For the second case, it is implied from the continuity of fi and the condition
that Ui is open.
Now, by the claim 2 it is easy to prove the lemma. Let X be an infinite
Hausdorff space and T a finite tree. Then for the cardinality of T , say N ,
there exists a number M such that for any space with at least M elements,
specially X , there exists the continuous surjection to T .
Theorem 5.14. (Completeness Theorem, Strong version) Let X be an infi-
nite Hausdorff space. Then
(i) If X TS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢BPC A
(ii) If X sS Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢EBPC A
(iii) If X S Γ⇒ A then Γ ⊢IPC A
Proof. The claim is a trivial combination of the following three facts: Firstly,
the modal spaces constructed from finite Kripke rooted trees (reflexive or
serial in the appropriate cases) are complete for the logics. Secondly, these
modal spaces are Alexandrov and finally they are surjective continuous image
of any infinite Hausdorff space by the Lemma 5.13.
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6 Categorical Semantics
In this section we will use different types of categories defined in the first
section as natural models for the sub-intuitionistic logics defined in the pre-
vious section. The following soundness-completeness result actually shows
that the seemingly strange behavior of implication in these logics is actually
quite natural.
Definition 6.1. Let C be a strong category which has product, coprod-
uct, the initial object and the terminal object. We say C has an internal
propositional structure if it internalizes all of its propositional structures, i.e.
product, coproduct, the terminal and the initial objects. For instance, for
product we should have the following condition: For every objects A, B and
C there exists pair : [A,B] × [A,C] → [A,B × C] such that the following
diagrams commute:
[C,A]× [C,B]
[C,A× B] [C,A]
pair
[id, p0]
p0
[C,A]× [C,B]
[C,A× B] [C,B]
pair
[id, p1]
p1
And we have to have the same for all the other parts of the propositional
structure.
Remark 6.2. Note that in the above definition, the natural internal version
of the uniqueness condition for the pairs is the condition that the morphism
pair should be a mono. However, this condition is redundant in our definition
because, using the external uniqueness, it is very easy to prove that the pair
is already a mono.
Definition 6.3. Let C be a category closed under finite products, finite
coproducts and has terminal and initial objects. Also Let h : Cop × C → C
be a functor and V be a function which assigns to any atomic formula in
the language L, an object in the category C. Extend V : L → Ob(C) as the
following:
(i) V (⊤) = 1 and V (⊥) = 0.
(i) V (A ∧ B) = V (A)× V (B).
(ii) V (A ∨ B) = V (A) + V (B).
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(iii) V (A→ B) = h(V (A), V (B)).
We say (C, V )  Γ ⇒ A, when there exists a morphism f :
∏
B∈Γ V (B) →
V (A). If for all V , (C, V )  Γ⇒ A holds, we say C  Γ⇒ A.
We have the following soundness and completeness theorems.
Theorem 6.4. (Soundness Theorem)
(i) If Γ ⊢KPC A then for any category C with internal propositional struc-
ture, C  Γ⇒ A.
(ii) If Γ ⊢BPC A then for any Curry category C with internal propositional
structure, C  Γ⇒ A.
(ii) If Γ ⊢IPC A then for any closed category C with internal propositional
structure, C  Γ⇒ A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of Γ ⊢ A.
The propositional rules are just easy consequences of the fact that × and
+ are product and coproduct. The same is true for ⊥ and ⊤ as the initial
and the terminal objects. The important part is the part of the formalized
rules. The formalized rules (∧I)f and (∨E)f are satisfied by the internal
structure of the category. The trf rule is implied by the internal structure
of hom. And finally the → I rule is satisfied by the natural transformation
γ : C(A,B) → C(1, [A,B]) which sends f to [1, f ](jA) and internalizes all
morphisms from A to B. For the additional rules, note that for the cur rule,
it suffices to have a natural transformation iX : X → [1, X ] and for the rule
T , the converse of iX works.
Theorem 6.5. (Completeness Theorem)
(i) If for any weakly closed category C with internal propositional structure,
C  Γ⇒ A, then Γ ⊢KPC A.
(ii) If for any Curry weakly closed category C with internal propositional
structure, C  Γ⇒ A, then Γ ⊢BPC A.
(ii) If for any closed category C with internal propositional structure, C 
Γ⇒ A, then Γ ⊢IPC A.
Proof. Notice that any modal space with its arrow is a strong category and
it is weakly-closed if J(1) = 1. On the other hand, since the modal spaces
constructed from Kripke models are enough to prove completeness, and since
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in these models we have J(1) = 1 if the relation R has the property that be-
fore any node, there should be another node, it is enough to prove that these
logics are complete with respect to their Kripke models with this additional
condition. This is obviously the case, because for any corresponding Kripke
frame, it is enough to add one reflexive node under all the nodes of the Kripke
model. This new model is a model with the condition and furthermore, truth
in all the nodes of this model implies the truth in all the nodes of the first
model.
7 Modal Topoi and Modal Lambda Calculus
In the previous sections, we developed the concept of a modal space and its
canonical logic. In this section we want to extend these investigations to the
higher and more structured level of generalized topological spaces as topoi
and generalized logics as modal simply typed lambda calculus. To begin, let
us define the notion of weakly Cartesian closed category as the weak version
of the usual Cartesian closed categories.
Definition 7.1. A pair (C, J) is called a weakly Cartesian closed category,
wcc, if C is a category with all finite limits and J : C → C is a functor such
that there exists a functor →: Cop × C → C in a way that
Hom(JC × A,B) ≃ Hom(C,A→ B)
naturally in A, B and C.
Moreover, if there exists a natural transformation πA : JA→ A, the category
is called temporal and if there exists a natural transformation σA → JA, it
is called cotemporal.
Just like the situation in Cartesian closed categories, it is possible to
define weak exponential objects by universal morphisms:
Theorem 7.2. A pair (C, J) is a weakly Cartesian closed category if it has
all finite limits and satisfies the following property: For any two objects A,B
there exist an objects A→ B and a morphism ev : J(A→ B)×A→ B such
that for any object C and any morphism f : JC × A→ B there is a unique
morphism λf : C → (A→ B) such that ev(Jλf × id) = f .
Proof. It is similar to the usual proof for the usual exponential objects.
Example 7.3. All modal spaces are weakly Cartesian closed. All Cartesian
closed categories are also wcc.
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Theorem 7.4. Let (C, J) be a weakly Cartesian closed category, then
(i) C equipped with →J is a strong category.
(ii) C equipped with →J is weakly closed iff J(1) ≃ 1.
(iii) C equipped with →J is Curry category iff there exists a natural trans-
formation π : A→ [1, A].
Proof. For (i), define jA : 1→ (A→J A) as λp1 and
L : ((A→J B)× (B →J C))→ (A→J C)
as λevB,C(Jp1, evA,B(Jp0×id)). It is not hard to prove that all the conditions
of the Definition 2.1, hold. (ii) and (iii) are similar.
Now it is time to lift the idea of the beginning of the third section from the
level of propositions and truth values to the level of types and constructions.
To do so, it is natural to replace the notion of space by its generalized version
of Grothendieck topoi and then adding a functor J to import the needed
part of the notion of time to implement the lifted version of predicative
implications which are function spaces now. It is also possible to interpret
the functor J as the higher order version of the Lawvere-Tierny topology
which lifts that morphism from the level of subobjects and inclusion to the
level of objects and morphisms.
Definition 7.5. A pair (E , J) is called a modal topos if E is a Grothendieck
topos and J : E → E is a colimit preserving functor. Moreover, if there exists
a natural transformation πA : JA → A, the modal topos is called temporal
and if there exists a natural transformation σA → JA, it is called cotemporal.
Example 7.6. Assume that E is a Grothendieck topos and f ∗ ⊣ f∗ : E → E
is a geometric morphism, then (E , f ∗) is a modal topos. The only thing that
we have to check is the colimit preserving condition of f ∗ which is evident
by the fact that it is a left adjoint.
Example 7.7. Assume that C is a small category and J : C→ C is a functor,
then (SetC
op
, J∗) where J∗(F ) = F ◦ J is a modal topos. As a concrete
example of such a modal topos, assume that C = (N,≤) and J : N → N
as J(n) = J(n−˙1). Then the modal topos of presheaves over N is actually
the space of variable sets (constructions) on which J∗ acts as a pulling back
operator to pull back a variable construction one level on the line of time.
Just like modal spaces, modal topoi have a natural weak exponential
object or as it seems natural to say, a predicative function space.
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Theorem 7.8. Let (E , J) be a modal topos. Then there exists a functor
[−,−] : Eop × E → E such that
Hom(JC ×A,B) ≃ Hom(C, [A,B])
naturally in A, B and C. Hence, any modal topos is a weakly Cartesian
closed category.
Proof. Since E is a Grothendieck topos, and J : E → E is a colimit preserving
functor, by the adjoint functor theorem, it has a right adjoint I : E → E .
Now, define [A,B] = I(BA). This funcor has the property because
Hom(JC ×A,B) ≃ Hom(JC,BA) ≃ Hom(C, I(BA)) = Hom(C, [A,B]).
Theorem 7.9. Let (F , J) be a modal topos, E be a Grothendieck topos and
f = (f∗ ⊣ f
∗) : E → F be a connected geometric morphism. Then if f ∗ has
a left adjoint, then there exists a functor I : Eop × E → E such that (E , I) is
a modal topos and f ∗(A→J B) ≃ f
∗(A)→I f
∗(B) natural in A and B.
Proof. Define I = f ∗Jf!. First of all, it is clear that
Hom(C, f ∗(A)→I f
∗(B)) ≃ Hom(IC × f ∗(A), f ∗(B)).
Then, we have
Hom(IC × f ∗(A), f ∗(B)) ≃ Hom(f ∗Jf!C × f
∗(A), f ∗(B)).
Since f ∗ is a right adjoint, it preserves limit, hence
Hom(IC × f ∗(A), f ∗(B)) ≃ Hom(f ∗(Jf!C × A), f
∗(B)).
But f is connected, which means that f ∗ is full and faithful, hence
Hom(IC × f ∗(A), f ∗(B)) ≃ Hom(Jf!C × A), B),
and then
Hom(IC × f ∗(A), f ∗(B)) ≃ Hom(f!C,A→J B).
Since f! ⊣ f
∗, we have
Hom(IC × f ∗(A), f ∗(B)) ≃ Hom(C, f ∗(A→J B)).
Therefore,
Hom(C, f ∗(A)→I f
∗(B)) ≃ Hom(C, f ∗(A→J B)).
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Now, let us define the right higher order language to describe weakly
Cartesian closed categories and consequently modal topoi to some extent.
This language, is an appropriate modal version of simply typed lambda cal-
culus.
By modal lambda calculus we mean the following system: The type con-
structors are ×, +, 0, 1, J , →. The terms constructors are 〈·, ·〉, p0, p1, r, l,
d, ∗, !, j, λ, ap. We now begin to build up a system of rules.
Structural Rules:
x : A ⊢ t(x) : B
F
y : JA ⊢ [jt(x)](y) : JB
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : A ~z : ∆, y : A ⊢ s(~z, y) : B
cut
~x : Γ, ~z : ∆ ⊢ s(~z, t(~x)) : B
Propositional Rules:
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : ⊥
⊥
~x : Γ ⊢!t(~x) : A
⊤
~x : Γ ⊢ ∗ : ⊤
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : A0 × A1
×E (i = 0, 1)
~x : Γ ⊢ pi(t(~x)) : Ai
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : A ~y : ∆ ⊢ s(~y) : B
×I
~x : Γ, ~y : ∆ ⊢ 〈t(~x), s(~y)〉 : A× B
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : A
+I
~x : Γ ⊢ l(t(~x)) : A +B
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : B
+I
~x : Γ ⊢ r(t(~x)) : A+B
~x : Γ, a : A ⊢ t(~x, a) : C ~y : ∆, b : B ⊢ s(~y, b) : C
+E
~x : Γ, ~y : ∆, e : A+B ⊢ d(a, b; t(~x, a), s(~y, b), e) : C
x : JC, a : A ⊢ t(x, a) : B
→ I
y : C ⊢ [λa.t(x, a)](y) : A→ B
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : A ~y : ∆ ⊢ s(~y) : J(A→ B)
→ E
~x : Γ, ~y : ∆ ⊢ ap(s(~y), t(~x)) : B
Additional Rules:
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : JA
J
~x : Γ ⊢ π(t(~x)) : A
~x : Γ ⊢ t(~x) : A
CoJ
~x : Γ ⊢ σ(t(~x)) : JA
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Note that by substitution we mean the usual natural recursive definition.
However, it is important to point out that in our system and in terms
[Jt(x)](y) and [λz.t(z, x)](y), the variable x is not considered free and the
only free variable in these terms is y. Therefore, we can just substitute y by
some term s, and the result of the substitution is [Jt(x)](s) and [λz.t(z, x)](s),
respectively.
Finally, the equality rules (β and η rules) consist of reflexivity, symmetry,
transitivity, being closed under substitution and also all the following rules:
For ⊤ and ⊥ we have:
t = ∗, for t : ⊤.
t(x) =!x for t(x : ⊥) : A.
For × we have
p0(〈x, y〉) = x and p1(〈x, y〉) = y.
〈p0(x), p1(x)〉 = x.
For + we have:
d(a, b; t(~x, a), s(~y, b), l(c)) = t(~x, c).
d(a, b; t(~x, a), s(~y, b), r(c)) = s(~y, c).
d(a, b; t(~x, l(a)), t(~x, r(b)), e) = t(~x, e).
For → we have:
ap([j[λy.t(x, y)]](x), y) = t(x, y).
[λy.ap([jt(x)], y)](x) = t(x).
For J we have:
[jt]([js](z)) = [jt(s)](z).
[jx](y) = y.
And in the presence of π or σ:
t(π(s)) = π([Jt](s)).
σ(t(s)) = [jt](σ(s)).
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The system of all the rules is called modal lambda calculus and is denoted
by mJλ. In the presence of J or CoJ we denote the system by Jλ and CoJλ
and we call them temporal and cotemporal, respectively. In the presence of
both, denote it by Iλ.
Theorem 7.10. (Soundness)
(i) mJλ is interpretable in any weakly Cartesian closed category. Specifi-
cally, it is interpretable in any modal topos.
(ii) Jλ is interpretable in any temporal weakly Cartesian closed category.
Specifically, it is interpretable in any temporal topos.
(iii) CoJλ is interpretable in any cotemporal weakly Cartesian closed cate-
gory. Specifically, it is interpretable in any cotemporal topos.
Proof. Interpret any type as an object and any term t(~x) : A where ~x : Γ as
a morphism from
∏
Γ to A. The rest is clear.
Lemma 7.11. (Embedding) Let C be a small category and J : C → C a
functor. Then there is a modal topos (E , I) such that (C, J) is embeddable
in the modal topos (E , I), i.e., there exists an embedding e : C → E in a
way that e preserves limit and I(e(c)) = e(J(c)) and consequently, e(c) →I
e(d) ≃ e(c→J d).
Proof. Consider J¯ : C→ SetC
op
as the combination of J and Yoneda embed-
ding, i.e., J¯ = y ◦ J . It is possible to lift J¯ to the topos SetC
op
, i.e., there
exists a colimit preserving Jˆ : SetC
op
→ SetC
op
such that Jˆ ◦ y = J¯ , hence
Jˆ(yc) = J¯(c) = y(Jc). The second part is clear from the first part.
Theorem 7.12. (Completeness) The syntax of the modal lambda calculus
forms a syntactical weakly Cartesian closed category. Therefore, mJλ is
complete with respect to all weakly Cartesian closed categories. Moreover,
the modal lambda calculus without coproducts and the zero element forms a
syntactical modal topos and hence modal topoi are complete for modal lambda
calculus without coproducts and the zero element. The same is true in the
presence of temporal and cotemporal conditions on both sides.
Proof. Define C(T ) as the syntactic category of the type theory T . It is
enough to interpret types as objects and terms as morphisms and the other
constructors as their canonical interpretation in the categorical terms. It is
clear that C(T ) is a weakly Cartesian closed category presumably with some
conditions regarding being temporal or cotemporal. For the second part,
since the syntactic category is a small category, we can embed C(T ) in a
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modal topos (SetC(T )
op
, Jˆ) as in the Lemma 7.11. Since J and Jˆ and their
exponentials act similarly relative to the Yoneda embedding, we can conclude
that the equality of interpreted morphisms in the modal topos implies the
equality of terms in the syntactic category C(T ). For the temporal and
cotemporal cases, it is sufficient to pick πˆ and σˆ as yπ and yσ.
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